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COMMENT
SHAREHOLDERS AFTER MERGER: WHAT
THEY CAN AND CANNOT DO UNDER
SEC RULES 144 AND 145
PATRICK D. HALLIGAN*
The purpose of this article is to illustrate the ways in which
SEC Rules 144' and 145 2 affect various classes of shareholders in
mergers. The key to its analysis is the placing of the shareholder into
one of nine possible categories. As to the acquired corporation, he
may be an affiliate, an ordinary investor or unconnected. The same
three possibilities exist for his relationship to the acquiring corpora-
tion. Thus there are nine combinations that can describe his status
with respect to the merging corporations. Three of the nine combi-
nations present no SEC problem—namely, those three in which the
shareholder, has no connection with the acquiring corporation. In
two of these three situations—where he is an affiliate of, or an
investor in, the acquired corporation—he will be paid in cash and
left without stock to worry about. The third situation, which obvi-
ously presents no problems, is that of a stranger connected with
neither corporation. The six remaining combinations are the ones
with which this artick is concerned. The charts accompanying this
article are constructed according to the various categories into which
shareholders may fall. The rows show the status of the shareholder
relative to the acquired corporation. The columns show his status
relative to the acquiring corporation. The intersection of each col-
umn and row shows the category in which a shareholder is situated.
In order to understand Rule 145 one must look at its predeces-
sor, Rule 133. 3 Although Rule 145 for the most part replaces Rule
133, interest in Rule 133 itself will persist in three ways. First, the
SEC has preserved Rule 133 in the case of companies regulated by
government agencies which, prior to January 1, 1973, have sought
agency approval to merge even though stockholder consent has not
* A.B., Stanford University, 1965; J.D., University of Chicago, 1968; Member of the
Illinois Bar.
17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1973).
2 17 C.F.R. § 230.145 (1973).
3 17 C.F.R. § 230.133 (19721, rescinded effective Jan. 1, 1973, SEC Securities Act
Release No. 5316 (Oct. 6, 1972).
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yet been sought by the directors. 4 Second, the same section of the
release preserves Rule 133 for incomplete mergers wherein directors
have submitted merger plans for shareholder consent before January
1973. 5 Third and most significant, shareholders holding securities
acquired in mergers long since completed under Rule 133 will have
recurring occasion to request opinions concerning the sale of their
stock. Rule 133 continues to regulate them. Thus, while corporate
level interest in Rule 133 will soon pass, shareholder interest in Rule
133 will continue indefinitely. The practical lawyer advising such
persons must be familiar with Rule 133 as well as with Rules 144
and 145. For these reasons it is practical to look at the operation of
Rule 133. Chart 1 does this. Its operation with and without registra-
tion is shown. The operation without registration is shown at the top
of each category. The operation with registration for any category of
shareholder is shown in the lower portion of the box reserved for
that category. Registration means registration under the Securities
Act of 1933 (1933 Act), 6 either by Form S-1 7 or by Form S-14. 8
Chart 2 shows the operation of Rules 144 and 145 for each
combination, both with and without registration. In this chart the
upper part of each box shows the operation of the rules with regis-
tration; the lower part of each box summarizes the operation of the
rules without registration for the category of shareholder to which
that box is reserved in Chart 2. Registration means compliance with
one of the alternatives of Rule 144(c). 9
Six categories of shareholders with SEC problems times two
operative rules (old Rule 133 of Chart 1 and new Rule 145 of Chart
2) times two alternatives as to registration (with or without) equals
24 situations requiring comment. These 24 situations are discussed
in the 24 notes. The note numbers correspond to reference numbers
in the boxes of the charts. The charts should be used first. The
corresponding note number should then be consulted for a practical
comment directed specifically to the rule, the shareholder category
and the applicable registration situation.'°
4 Section I under the heading "Operation of the Rules," SEC Securities Act Release No.
5316 (Oct. 6, 1972).
5 Id.
6
 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1970).
7 See 1 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 7121 (1971).
9 See 1 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 7271 (1971). See also Form 5-14, General Instructions
A, Rule as to use of Form S-14, 1 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 7281 (1972).
9 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(c) (1973).
10
 As used in the charts and in Rule 144, the word "affiliate" of an issuer means a person
directly or indirectly controlling, controlled by or under common control with that issuer. See
Rule 144(a)(1). The identity of such controlling persons has been the subject of much litiga-
tion, See Sommer, Who's in "Control"—S.E.C., 21 Bus. Law. 559 (1966). As used in the
charts, "ordinary" shareholder means one who is not an "affiliate,"
71
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
CHART 1
RULE 133
Without Registration
With Registration
Status of
Shareholder
as to
Acquired Company
Status of Shareholder as to
Acquiring Company
Ordinary Af iliate None
Ordinary (1) Freely Saleable Stock (2) No Sale Paid
without registration Allowed in
Cash
Ordinary (7) Freely Saleable Stock (8) Very Limited; Paid
with registration 144(e)-(h); in
144(d) ques-
tionable;
Cash
Rule 237 not
available
Affiliate (3) Very Limited Sales; (4) No Sale Paid
without registration 133(d),	 (e) Allowed; in
leakage like (2) Cash
Affiliate (9) Either Freely Saleable (10) Very Limited; Paid
with registration Stock or Very Limited;
if Limited, may use
either 133 leakage
as in (3) or com-
ply with 144(d)-(h)
or Rule 237
like (8) in
Cash
None (5) No Sales for 5 years; (6) No Sale Stranger
without registration Very Limited by Allowed; like
Rule 237 thereafter (2) and (4)
None (11) Freely Saleable or (12) Very Limited; Stranger
with registration Very Limited; may
comply with 144(d)-(h)
or Rule 237,
but not 133(d), (e)
like (8) and
(I0)
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CHART 2
RULE 145
Without Registration
With Registration
Status of
Shareholder
as to
Acquired Company
Status of Shareholder as to
Acquiring Company
Ordinary Affiliate None
Ordinary (13) No Sales for 5 years; (14) No Sale Paid
without registration Very Limited by Rule Allowed; in
237 thereafter;
like (5)
like (2), (4),
(6)
Cash
Ordinary (19) Freely Saleable Stock (20) Very Limited; Paid
with registration like (8), (10), (12) in
Cash
Affiliate (15) No Sales for 5 years; (16) No Sale Paid
without registration Very Limited by Rule Allowed; in
237 thereafter; like
(5) and (13)
like (2), (4),
(6), (14)
Cash
Affiliate
with registration
(21) Limited; 144(c), (e),
(g) apply, but not
(d), (h); Rule 237
alternative available
(22) Very Limited;
like (8), (10),
(12), (20)
Paid
in
Cash
None (17) No Sales for 5 years; (18) No Sale Stranger
without registration Very Limited by Rule
237 thereafter; like
(5), (13), (15)
Allowed;
like (2), (4),
(6), (14), (16)
None (23) Very Limited; 144(e)- (24) Very Limited; Stranger
with registration (h); 144(d) question-
able; Rule 237 avail-
able
like (8), (10),
(12), (20), (22)
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NOTES TO CHARTS 1 AND 2
RULE 133 WITHOUT REGISTRATION
1. This category has freely saleable stock. See Ruder, Federal
Restrictions on the Sale of Securities, 67 Nw. U.L. Rev. 60 (Supp.
1972); Schwartz, Business Combinations Under New SEC Rules, 67
Nw. U.L. Rev. 150, 152, 156-57 (Supp. 1972); Cohen, Rule 133 and
the S.E.C., 14 Record of N.Y.C.B.A. 167, 177-78 (1959).
2. Rule 144, including 144(c), applies. Thus, without "current
information" on file, this category cannot sell at all. Not even Rule
237 applies. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.237 (1973).
3. Rule 133(c) gives these persons the use of "leakage sales"
under Rules 133(d) and 133(e). "Leakage sales" refers to the provi-
sion in the rule that a person subject to its terms may sell unregis-
tered securities to the public in ordinary, unsolicited brokerage
transactions, subject however to extreme limitations in quantity. See
17 C.F.R. § 230.133(d)(3) (1972), rescinded, SEC Securities Act
Release No. 5316 (Oct. 6, 1972). Rule 144 has similar provisions.
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(e)(1) (1973).
4. Same as category 2; no sales at all, not even after five years,
on account of affiliate status.
5. These are limited by new Rule 144. Without Rule 144(c)
"current information" on file, they may only sell after five years
under Rule 237. Rule 133 does not assist these persons because they
had nothing to do with the constituent as to whose shareholders
Rule 133 was primarily addressed.
6. Same as categories 2 and 4; no sales at all.
RULE 133 WITH REGISTRATION
7. Category 7 has freely saleable stock. They are not under-
writers so the exemption of § 4(1) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. §
77d(1) (1970), is available unless some atypical fact exists. See the
authorities cited in Note 1 supra. The fact of registration assumed in
category 7 should reinforce the Note 1 conclusion as to persons in
category 7 even if no public offering is found.
8. Rules 144(c)-(h) apply. Rule 144(c) is fulfilled by the S - 14
registration. Rule 144(d) applies despite registration if the distribu-
tion is not public. But usually a public offering will be found so that
the securities are not restricted in the sense of Rule 144(a)(3), and
hence Rule 144(d) will not apply. Thus volume restrictions usually
exist, but not "holding period" limitations. Rule 237 is not available
as an alternative.
9. If the issuance is considered public, then category 9 has
freely saleable stock. Otherwise the shareholders may choose to
operate under either the Rule 133(d) or Rule 133(e) leakage provi-
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sions of category 3 or all of the Rule 144(d)-(h) provisions which are
substantially (but not exactly) similar to Rules 133(d) and 133(e). In
the latter case, Rule 144(h) notice of sale to the SEC is required. The
Rule 144 alternatives exist in category 9 since Rule 144(d) "current
information" is provided by S-14 registration. This is not so for
category 3. The Rule 237 alternative is also open to category 9.
10. Same as category 8. The 144(d) "holding period" require-
ment is the same as for category 8.
11. Persons in category 11 have either freely saleable stock or
restricted stock limited by all of Rule 144(d)-(h), depending on the
circumstances of their initial acquisition. Rule 237 is an available
alternative. See Note 5 supra concerning nonapplicability of Rule
133 leakage.
12. Same as categories 8 and 10.
RULE 145 WITHOUT REGISTRATION
13. Category 13 consists of persons who would ask: "What, if
anything, does Rule 145 do for ordinary small shareholders whose
company does not provide 144(c) current information?" Their coun-
sel might be tempted to argue that they have freely saleable stock on
the strength of the analogy to category 1 and the language of the
release quoted in Note 19 infra. That quotation uses the word
"registered," however, which indicates an assumption that current
information is on file with the commission in some form. That
assumption is at variance with the hypothesis of category 13, and
unlike categories 7 and 19, which do assume filing. The category 1
analogy is weak. Like categories 7, 13 and 19, category 1 persons
are ordinary shareholders as to each entity, and, like category 13,
category 1 assumes no filing. However, it is premised on a rescinded
rule which Rule 145 is designed to supersede. Rule 144 therefore
applies unabated by Rule 145 to category 13. Rule 144(c) not being
satisfied, no sale is permitted for five years. Rule 237 sales after five
years are possible.
14. No sale at any time. Same as categories 2, 4 and 6.
15. No sale for five years. The Rule 145(c) definition of party
includes these affiliates but no relief under Rule 145(d) is available.
Rule 145(d) requires compliance with Rules 144(c), (e), (f) and (g).
By hypothesis here, Rule 144(c) current information is not on file.
Rule 237 applies, however, for sales after five years.
16. No sale at any time. Same as categories 2, 4, 6 and 14.
17. No sale for five years. First, as in Notes 13 and 15, the
absence of current information filings prevents any operation of Rule
145. Second, like category 13 shareholders, category 17 shareholders
are neither parties whose assets or capital structure is altered in the
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sense of Rule 145(c), nor are they affiliates of any such party. Third,
category 17 persons are associated not with the constituent but only
with the acquiring issuer, who is not included in Rule 145(c). Thus,
Rule 144 applies unabated. Rule 144(c) not being fulfilled, no sale is
permitted for five years. Rule 237 is available after that time.
18. No sale at any time. Like categories 2, 4, 6, 14 and 16,
category 18 demonstrates that affiliates of surviving acquiring is-
suers must look to some form of registration under Rules 144 and
145.
RULE 145 WITH REGISTRATION
19. Freely saleable stock. See authorities cited in Note 1 by
analogy. See also § ILD of SEC Securities Act Release No. 5316
(Oct. 6, 1972), the last paragraph of which states: "The securities
received in a Rule 145 transaction by persons who are neither
affiliates of the acquired company nor of the acquiring company are
registered without restriction on resale." [Emphasis added.] The
applicability of this quotation to category 13 is questionable. See
Note 13 supra.
Affiliates of the acquired corporation are now in a clearer
position than they were under Rule 133. The language of the
above-quoted release is not qualified. Also, the theory of Rule 145
supports the free stock conclusion better than did the Rule 133
notion. Rule 145 assumes registration or periodic reporting. The
"exemption" of Rule 145 thus touches on the availability of informa-
tion about the security. It is a security exemption. In contrast, Rule
133 is a transaction exemption. The rationale of Rule 133, stated in
133(a), is that no "sale" for purposes of § 5 of the 1933 Act, 15
U.S.C. § 77e, takes place in mergers. Thus, on the face of Rule 133,
only the particular exchange or merger transaction is exempt from
§ 5 of the 1933 Act. Subsequent sales by non-affiliates must find
their own exemption. Thus a non-affiliate leaves a Rule 133 ex-
change as he entered it. This is sometimes called the survival of
"taint." See Thompson Ross Securities Co., 6 S.E.C. 1111, 1117-18
(1940); SEC Securities Act Release No. 4248 (July 14, 1960). The
commission position shown in the preceding authorities is that cer-
tain exemptions, if actually private in character, are to be evaluated
as the equivalent of the § 4(2) exemption, a transaction exemption.
See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1970). The exemptions so treated have
included some which fall under § 3 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77c
(1970), which are analogous to Rule 133 transactions, viz, §§ 3(a)(9)
and 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c(a)(9), (10) (1970). Also similarly
treated have been "negotiated" merger transactions. See Disclosures
to Investors: A Reappraisal of Federal Administrative Policies
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Under the '33 and '34 Acts The Wheat Report], ch. VII, § B.1.(f)
(1969). A negotiated transaction is one in which corporate approval
is necessary for perfection, a controlling shareholder or group con-
stituting by themselves the majority required for shareholder ap-
proval under state corporation law. This requirement created cer-
tain potential anomalies under Rule 133. An ordinary investor who
had acquired outstanding shares from another non-affiliate investor
enjoyed the exemption provided by § 4(1) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. §
77d(1) (1970), and continued to have free stock after a Rule 133
transaction. Under the authorities cited in Note 1 supra, and limit-
ing the authorities cited in this Note to their facts, it was possible to
argue that all non-affiliates of an acquired company should have free
stock. The fact that that is the result under Rule 145 might lend
some small measure of added weight to that view. But the consensus
has been that non-affiliates of the acquired company had free stock
after exchange only if they had it before exchange. See Schwartz,
Business Combinations Under SEC Rules, 67 Nw. U.L. Rev. 150,
157 (Stipp. 1972). Thus, for example, a recipient of a 1933 Act § 4(2)
private placement ("letter" stock) arguably continued to have re-
stricted stock after exchange even though similarly situated
non-affiliates of an acquired firm had free stock of the same category
issued by the acquiring firm. This anomaly is not even argued by the
Commission in the release accompanying Rule 145, quoted supra in
this Note.
20. Same as categories 8, 10 and 12. A grammatical impreci-
sion occurs in Rule 145(c) when it refers to: "any party . . . other
than the issuer, or any party who is an affiliate of such party •	 ."
17 C.F.R. § 230.145(c) (1973) (emphasis added). The ambiguity to
be interpreted is this: Does "affiliate of such party" include affiliate
of the issuer? If it does, then Rule 145(d) allows such an affiliate to
avoid the holding period and notice requirements of Rule 144(d) and
Rule 144(h) which would otherwise bind him. The construction
adopted here is that affiliates of an acquiring corporation are not
protected by Rule 145(d), notwithstanding ambiguity in Rule 145(c).
If the opposite construction is taken, holders of restricted securities
who are controlling shareholders of a very large firm could avoid
parts of Rule 144 by causing their issuer to acquire a very small
firm.
21. Rule 145(d) directs application of Rules 144(c) and
144(e)-(g), but excuses compliance with the 144(d) holding period
and 144(h) notice of sale limitation for these persons. The Rule 237
alternative is permitted.
22. Same as categories 8, 10, 12 and 20.
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23. Category 23 is troublesome. Just as Rule 133 did not
protect, perhaps anomalously, persons in categories 5 and 11, so
Rule 145 may not protect those in category 23. Rule 145(c) contains
a definition of "party" that excludes category 23 non-affiliate
shareholders of the surviving entity who were not shareholders of
the constituent (vanishing) corporation. Thus Rule 144 applies un-
abated, specifically 144(d)-(h). Rule 237 alternatives also exist. As to
the applicability of 144(d), see Note 8 supra.
24. Same as categories 8, 10, 12, 20 and 22.
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